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Abstract:
Rapidly growing natural gas demand in China has formed a precondition to investigate the
potential of several pipelines from Russia and other CIS countries, which could possibly head
their flows to the Chinese natural gas market. The variety of proposed projects and the
difference in their characteristics results in competition and, therefore, in order to assess the
projects’ economic perspectives a game-theoretic approach is used. A two-step procedure for
the problem’s game-theoretic formulation is proposed.
In the instantaneous supply game the players have the possibility to supply natural gas to
the market. Each player determines his or her supply levels in such a way that profits are
maximized, taking into account the supplies of all other players.
In the game of timing the players have to decide when to construct their pipelines. Due to the
growing demand for natural gas, the time of entering the market plays an important role. The
players seek to maximize the net present value of their investment by choosing the pipelines’
start of commercial operation from a discrete set of years. The equilibria obtained from the
supply game are used to calculate the payoff matrices for each pipeline in the timing game.
Both games are formulated and implemented as mixed complementarity problems which al-
lows the analysis of the competition of up to 5 pipeline projects simultaneously. Results for
the Chinese natural gas market are presented and discussed with an emphasis on sensitivity
analysis.
1 Introduction
Of all fossil energy carriers, natural gas is expected to show the strongest growth in demand
over the next decades. In its World Energy Outlook 2002 the International Energy Agency
(IEA) forecasts an average annual growth of world natural gas consumption by 2.4% between
2000 and 2030. The estimates for East Asia are significantly higher and show a demand
growth of 3.7% per annum in the same time period [IEA 2002b]. The spread of growth rates
among the region’s countries is considerable, with China showing the highest demand growth
of annually 5.5%. Other forecasts even indicate growth rates of up to 8.3% for China between
1990 and 2020 [APERC 2002], resulting in a considerably higher demand in 2020. For an
overview of different projections of China’s natural gas demand see [IEA 2002a].
This rapidly evolving natural gas demand in China, which is also expected to result in high
import requirements in the future, has led to planning activities for several pipelines from
Russia and other CIS countries to the Chinese market. Economic and technical data of the
pipeline projects show significant differences which suggests that some have better chances
to compete successfully on the market than others. Both the expected growth of the demand
on the northeast Asian gas markets and the numerous competing projected pipelines form
a precondition for a game-theoretic analysis of the situation. Since many of the pipelines
are proposed by different companies or consortia, non-cooperative game theory provides a
possible framework for this analysis [Nash 1950].
Two factors mainly determine the behavior of the pipeline projects’ managements, (i)
with growing demand the expected profits increase, so it might be advisable to postpone
the market entry for a while and (ii) once other pipelines are already active on the market,
due to competition among the suppliers their profits are expected to decrease. The time of
entering the market is therefore of particular importance for the projects to be profitable.
Thus, there is a game situation where the key parameters are times, at which the participants
enter the market. This concept has been formalized in the context of collaborative studies
undertaken by IIASA’s Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) and Dynamic
Systems (DYN) Programs and a network of Russian institutions. In [Klaassen et al. 2004]
the timing game between two competitors was described, its mathematical structure was
analyzed in detail, followed by illustrative examples on the Turkish and Chinese natural gas
markets. Other applications of the concept oriented to Turkey’s natural gas market can be
found in [Klaassen et al. 2003, Golovina et al. 2002]. Results have also been presented on a
number of conferences [Klaassen et al. 2002, Minullin et al. 2002, Minullin et al. 2001].
In this paper we follow the basic idea presented in [Klaassen et al. 2004]. However, since
our main focus is the model’s applicability, the formalization and implementation of the
game situation differ from the original concept in [Klaassen et al. 2004]. We define discrete
commercialization times as strategies, which allow us to compute Nash equilibria in prac-
tical applications for up to 5 competing projects. The problem is implemented in GAMS
[Brooke et al. 1998] as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and the solvers PATH
[Dirkse et al. 1995, Ferris et al. NA] and MILES [Rutherford 1993] are used for locating Nash
equilibria.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the game-theoretic modeling ap-
proach that is applied in the analysis. In section 3 details on the model implementation
as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) are presented. A brief description of the soft-
ware that has been developed for practical applications follows. Section 4 is dedicated to the
treatment of various sources of uncertainties within the model. In section 5 a short overview
over the expected development of the natural gas markets in China and the trans-national
pipelines that have been proposed to satisfy the growing demand for gas is given. The results
of model calculations for a number of pipeline projects to China are presented and discussed
in section 6. The paper ends with an outlook on further possible development activities of
the model in section 7.
2 Model Description
The modeling of the pipeline game can be divided into two parts, the so-called instantaneous
supply game and the game of timing [Klaassen et al. 2004, Klaassen et al. 2003].
In the instantaneous supply game a number of players have the possibility to supply natural
gas to a market. Each player then chooses his or her supply level to the market in such a way
that his or her profits are maximized, taking into account the supplies of all other players.
Due to the pipelines’ limited capacities, the competition can be formulated as a Nash-Cournot
game [Cournot 1838] with additional constraints.
In the game of timing the projects’ commercialization times are the strategic variables.
The equilibria obtained from the instantaneous supply game are used to calculate the net
present value of a pipeline project. Obviously this value does not only depend on the com-
mercialization time of a single player, but also on the commercialization times of all other
players. Choosing discrete time periods as strategies, this can formulated as a game in normal
(or strategic) form. For this class of games it can be shown that there always exists a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies (see e.g. [Fudenberg et al. 1991]).
2.1 Terminology and Notation
In this paper we use the terms project, pipeline and player interchangeably when referring to
the pipeline projects either in a game-theoretic or economic context. The term commercial-
ization time, introduced above, will be used with respect to the point of time, representing
completion of the construction and start of commercial operation of a pipeline.
All pipeline projects are characterized by their economic and technical parameters, such
as investment cost, fixed and variable operation and maintenance costs, capacity and tech-
nical lifetime. In addition to the parameters characterizing the projects, assumptions on the
development of the markets have to be made. In the model the behavior of the demand
side is described by an inverse demand function (price formation function). This description
corresponds to a liberalized (spot) market for natural gas. Table 1 provides an overview of
all parameters that are used in the model’s mathematical formulation.
parameter description units1
p0 natural gas price at given demand d0 [$/1000cm]
ep absolute value of price elasticity at demand d0 [-]
ri discount rate for player i [-]
Mi pipeline capacity for player i [bcm/a]
cexti specific gas extraction costs [$/1000cm]
cvari specific variable transport costs [$/1000cm]
cfixi specific fixed annual costs [mill.$/(bcm/a)]
cinvi total investment costs [mill.$]
canni annuity of investment costs [mill.$]
ttechi technical lifetime of pipeline i [a]
tecoi economic lifetime of pipeline i [a]
pmax exogenous upper price limit [$/1000cm]
Table 1: Parameters used in the formalization of the games.
The formulations of both the instantaneous supply game and the game of timing are
universal for any number of players. Thus the number of players n that participate in the
1cm = cubic meter (m3), bcm = billion cubic meter (109 m3)
game is in principle arbitrary. However, when analyzing the situation on a particular market,
for numerical reasons we restrict ourselves to n ≤ 5.
As it is common practice in the game-theoretic literature, if the strategy space of player
i is denoted by Si and si ∈ Si are the corresponding strategies, we denote by s−i the set of
strategies of all players except those of player i
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) .
Accordingly, the Cartesian product of strategy spaces of all players i apart from that of player
i is denoted by
S−i = S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn .
2.2 Instantaneous Supply Game
As briefly mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the instantaneous supply game models
the optimal behavior of players which have the possibility to supply natural gas to a market.
Hence, each player will choose his or her supply level in such a way that profits are maximized,
taking into account the supplies of all other players. We assume perfect information, i.e. each
player knows all parameters of the other projects and in turn they know that he knows and
so on.
2.2.1 Game Formalization
Let there be n profit maximizing players that consider building a pipeline to deliver natural
gas to a market. Let yi be the positive supply levels which are also limited by the maximum
pipeline capacities Mi. Hence the amount of natural gas delivered by player i to the market
is constrained by the following restrictions
yi ≥ 0 and (1)
yi ≤ Mi . (2)
Let p(y) denote the inverse demand function, where y is the total amount of gas on the market
y = yext +
∑
i
yi . (3)
Here yext is the amount of gas supplied by numerous producers that are not considered
explicitly in the game. As a first step, we introduce a linear inverse demand function, having
two independent parameters. A discussion of different forms of inverse demand functions
follows in section 4.2. We choose to parameterize the function by the price p0 and the price
elasticity’s absolute values ep at a given demand d0. Under the assumption that market is in
equilibrium, i.e. supply equals demand, the linear inverse demand function’s parameterization
in terms of p0 and ep looks as follows
p(y) =
p0
ep
(
1 + ep − y
d0
)
, (4)
where y is the above defined total supply of natural gas to the market. The profit of player i
is then given by
pii(yi, y−i) =
[
p(y)− cexti − cvari
]
yi − cfixi ·Mi − canni , (5)
where we use the annuity of investment costs, which is defined as
canni = c
inv
i
(1 + ri)
tecoi · ri
(1 + ri)
tecoi − 1 . (6)
In this formula ri is the discount rate and tecoi the economic lifetime of project i. Although
the model is built in such a way that there are different values possible for the players, we
usually work with the same values for all players and only consider impacts of deviations from
this practice in the sensitivity analysis.
2.2.2 Price Constraint
Natural gas, delivered by pipeline (PNG) has to compete with alternative fuels on the energy
markets. Apparently liquefied natural gas (LNG) is such an alternative which can substitute
PNG directly. Supplying the same final product and thus competing on the same markets,
LNG terminal projects can be modeled in exactly the same way as pipeline projects. However,
in the considered example we assume that the spot market price plng in the regional LNG
market will serve as an upper bound for the endogenously calculated price (4). Furthermore,
the possibility to switch to other energy carriers (e.g. coal, oil, renewables) will act as an
upper bound on the price of gas. Since such alternatives are not explicitly present in the
model, the only possibility to include them effectively is via the simple condition
p(y) ≤ pmax . (7)
Obviously the upper price limit pmax is an exogenously defined quantity. An upper bound on
the price p(y) can be directly translated into a lower bound ymin for the supplied quantity
y(p) by applying eq. (4)
ymin = d0 ·
[
1 + ep
(
1− pmax
p0
)]
. (8)
At this point some care is needed, since in the case of a sufficiently low price limit pmax the
problem becomes infeasible. If
∑
iMi < ymin, eq. (8) is in contradiction with the pipeline
capacity constraint (2). In such a situation, the model endogenous price p(y) has to be fixed
to the level of pmax and the game theoretic problem is reduced to a market with perfect
competition, i.e. the players are price takers. Equation (5) simplifies to
pii(yi) =
[
pmax − cexti − cvari
]
yi − cfixi ·Mi − canni (9)
and each player’s choice is independent of the other players’ strategies.
2.2.3 Optimization with Inequality Constraints
However, if eq. (8) is not in contradiction with (2), it is possible to include (7) as a constraint
into the model and thus force the players to supply as much natural gas as necessary to ensure
that the endogenously determined price (4) does not exceed the exogenous price limit pmax.
To define the maximization problem under the (inequality) constraints (2) and (7), we
have to introduce Lagrange parameters λmaxi and λp. Hence we obtain the problem’s Lagrange
function for player i
Li(yi, y−i) = pii(yi, y−i)− λmaxi (yi −Mi)− λp (p(y)− pmax) .
In this game, the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is obtained by solving the quadratic system
of equations that results from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the constrained (inequality)
maximization problem for all players. The conditions for player i are defined to be
∂Li(yi, y−i)
∂yi
= 0 ,
λmaxi ≥ 0 , yi ≤Mi and λmaxi (yi −Mi) = 0
λp ≥ 0 , p(y) ≤ pmax and λp (p(y)− pmax) = 0 .
(10)
The latter two rows of equations are called complementary slackness conditions, because at
most one of them is slack, i.e. not an equality.
For the simple price formation mechanism (4) the partial derivative of the Lagrange func-
tion with respect to the supply of player i is
∂Li(yi, y−i)
∂yi
=
p0
ep
1 + ep − 1
d0
yext +∑
j
yj + yi
−(cexti +cvari )−λmaxi −λp p0ep · d0 . (11)
As can be seen easily from eq. (5), in the case of the linear inverse demand (4), pii(yi, y−i)
is concave for every i. Furthermore the restrictions (2) and (7) are linear. Hence the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions (10) are both necessary and sufficient for a global optimum [Kuhn et al. 1951].
However, by assuming a different inverse demand function, e.g. an isoelastic one, this is not
necessarily true any longer and the concavity of pii(yi, y−i) has to be established explicitly
(see section 4.2).
The value of the Lagrange multipliers at the problem’s solution are equal to the rate of
change in the maximal value of the objective function(s) as the constraint is relaxed. Hence
λmaxi and λp can be considered as the shadow prices of the corresponding restrictions.
2.3 Game of Timing
In contrast to the above described instantaneous supply game, the game of timing is modeled
as a finite n-person game in normal form. This is achieved by allowing only discrete time
steps as strategies, i.e. as possible commercialization years of the projects. Therefore its
formulation is different from that of the above discussed Nash-Cournot game, although – as
will be shown later – it can be treated within the same class of optimization problems.
2.3.1 Game Formalization
The model’s time horizon is defined by the (discrete) set of years t,
t = {t0 . . . t1} . (12)
Here t0 corresponds to the first model year that is also used as a base year for discounting.
The years of project commercialization ti, which are the strategies of the players, form subsets
of t. These subsets do not necessarily have to be the same for all players, due to possible
constraints related to individual projects. For example one can imagine a situation in which
one of the projects cannot enter the market prior to a certain year for technical or even
administrative reasons. Thus we define the strategy set for player i to be
Si = {t0i . . . t1i , ei} with t0i ≥ t0 and t1i ≤ t1 , (13)
where ei is an (optional) exit strategy, which corresponds to the decision not to build the
pipeline at all. For the sake of a simplified notation, we will use the following unified syntax
Si = {s1i . . . smii } with mi = (t1i − t0i + 1) + δie , (14)
where δie = 1 if an exit strategy for player i is defined and 0 otherwise.
The project’s net present value over the whole time horizon serves as objective function
of each player. Therefore the payoff functions Πi are defined as follows
Πi(si, s−i) =
t1∑
t=t0
(1− ri)t−t0pii(yi(t), y−i(t), t) ·Θ(t− ti) ·Θ(ti + ttechi − t) · (1− δsiei) . (15)
pii(yi(t), y−i(t), t) are the profit functions from the instantaneous supply game for a given
time period t and (1− ri)t−t0 is the discount factor relative to the base year t0. For a given
combination of strategies si, s−i the supply game’s equilibrium solutions yi(t), y−i(t) are used
to calculate the cash flow for all year t, corresponding to the particular market situation. The
Θ- or unit-step-function is defined as
Θ(t) =

1 , t ≥ 0
0 , t < 0
, (16)
where the first Θ-function in (15) ensures that a player has entered the market before making
profits, i.e. the strategy ti corresponds to a year after the current time t in the sum. The
second Θ-function guarantees that a pipeline is still within its technical lifetime. Here we
interpret the technical lifetime as a period after construction during which the pipeline can
operate without making further investments. In fact this time span is not fixed and in reality
can be prolonged by improved maintenance activities. However, we exclude this possibility
in this paper and use fixed values for the pipelines’ lifetime.
The term containing the Kronecker delta (1− δsiei) symbolizes that profit function equals
zero in the case of choosing the exit strategy ei, independent from the choice of the other
players. Formally, the Kronecker delta is defined to be
δsisj =

1 , si = sj
0 , si 6= sj
. (17)
2.3.2 Example: 2-player game
To illustrate the calculation procedure for the payoff matrices Πi(si, s−i) we will have a
look at a 2-player game with just two time periods t = 0, 1, two possible choices for the
commercialization times ti = 0, 1 for i = 1, 2 and no exit strategies. Apparently there are
altogether four possible payoffs for each player in this situation, which are shown below.
Πi(t1 = 0, t2 = 0) = (1− ri)0 · pii(y1(0), y2(0), 0) + (1− ri)1 · pii(y1(1), y2(1), 1)
Πi(t1 = 0, t2 = 1) = (1− ri)0 · pii(y1(0), 0, 0) + (1− ri)1 · pii(y1(1), y2(1), 1)
Πi(t1 = 1, t2 = 0) = (1− ri)0 · pii(0, y2(0), 0) + (1− ri)1 · pii(y1(1), y2(1), 1)
Πi(t1 = 1, t2 = 1) = (1− ri)0 · pii(0, 0, 0) + (1− ri)1 · pii(y1(1), y2(1), 1)
As already mentioned, the payoff functions pii(y1(t), y2(t), t) have to be chosen in such a way,
that they represent the situation corresponding to the strategy combination s1 = t1, s2 = t2.
For example if t ≥ t1 and t < t2, the payoff function for only player 1 being present on the
market has to be summed for this particular period t. For t ≥ t1 and t ≥ t2 pii(y1(t), y2(t), t)
has to represent a situation where both players are participating in the instantaneous supply
game at time t. A “0” as a supply level of a player indicates absence from the market.
As it was shown in [Klaassen et al. 2004] Π1(t1 = 2, t2 = 1) equals Π1(t1 = 2, t2 = 2)
and Π2(t1 = 1, t2 = 2) equals Π2(t1 = 2, t2 = 2). This symmetry can be used to reduce
the number of operations to calculate the payoff function matrices Πi(ti, t−i) for the game of
timing, which can become time consuming. For n players, each of which has m strategies,
the number of assignments is n · mn and can be reduced to n ·∑mj=1 jn−1 by applying the
generalized n-player symmetry.
2.3.3 Mixed Strategies
For the game of timing a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies might not exist. It can be shown
though that finite n-player games in normal form always have a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies (Nash’s theorem [Nash 1951]). Although Nash equilibria in mixed strategies might
appear to be of little help for the players, because the investment decision has to be made
once and for all, the credible implementation of a mixed strategy (e.g. to toss a coin) can
force the competitors to react differently, resulting in another Nash equilibrium. From the
computational point of view mixed strategies have the advantage of introducing continuous
variables. This allows us finally to formulate the game of timing as a mixed complementarity
problem as will be shown in section 3. Furthermore, pure strategies are a special case of
mixed strategies and thus can also be found in principle by the same algorithm.
Now we formally introduce mixed strategies and subsequently derive optimality conditions
for the players. The set of mixed strategies for player i is defined to be
∆(Si) =
qi : Si → R+ | ∑
si∈Si
qi(si) = 1
 , (18)
where qi(si) is the probability with which player i chooses the pure strategy si ∈ Si. If the
players choose the n-tuple q = (q1, . . . , qn) of mixed strategy vectors, the expected payoff to
player i is
ψi(qi(si), q−i(s−i)) =
∑
(s1,...,sn)∈
S1×...×Sn
n∏
j=1
qj(sj) ·Πi(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) . (19)
2.3.4 Optimization with Equality Constraints
Similar to the instantaneous supply game we can now introduce a Lagrangean with a set of
equality constraints, that ensure the sum of the probabilities to be unity
∑
si
qi(si) = 1 for
each individual player i
Li(qi(si), q−i(s−i)) = ψi(qi, q−i)− λi
∑
si∈Si
qi(si)− 1
 . (20)
The derivative of Li with respect to all qi(si), si = s1i . . . s
mi
i provides the first-order conditions
for this problem
0 =
∂Li(qi(si), q−i(s−i))
∂qi(si)
and
0 =
∂Li(qi(si), q−i(s−i))
∂λi
.
(21)
By inserting (20) and (19) into conditions (21) explicitly, we obtain the following set of
(m+i −m−i + 1) + 1 equations for every player i
0 =
∑
s−i∈S−i
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
qj(sj) ·Πi(si, s−i)− λi , (22)
0 =
∑
si∈Si
qi(si)− 1 . (23)
Having derived the first-order conditions for both parts of the game situation, we can proceed
to their formulation and implementation as so-called mixed complementarity problems.
3 Mixed Complementarity Problem
In this section we will describe the formulation of both the supply game and the game of
timing as complementarity problems. Their implementation in GAMS (General Algebraic
Modeling System) as mixed complementarity problems (MCP) will also be discussed briefly.
3.1 Model Formulation as MCP
It is a well known fact that n person non-cooperative games can be formulated as variational
inequality problems under certain conditions [Ferris et al. 1997]. For Nash-Cournot games
and n player matrix games (generalization of bimatrix games) it is possible to find an imple-
mentation as complementarity problems. Using modeling languages such as AMPL or GAMS
and the standard solvers that come along with them, these can be handled without having to
implement the solution algorithms (e.g. [Ferris et al. 2000]).
3.1.1 Definition of MCP
The classical nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP), defined by the nonlinear function
F : Rn → Rn, is to find a x ∈ Rn such that
0 ≤ x ⊥ F (x) ≥ 0 . (24)
Here the ⊥ notation is used to signify that componentwise one of the two adjacent inequal-
ities must be satisfied as an equality, i.e. in addition the condition xTF (x) = 0 also holds.
Equivalently, componentwise this can be stated as
xi ≥ 0 , Fi(x) ≥ 0 , xiFi(x) = 0 , i = 1, . . . , n . (25)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (10) and (11) of the instantaneous supply game are of similar
form. To achieve the exact form of an NCP condition, eq. (11) has to be paired with the
supply variables yi. The meaning of the pairing is that either the supply variable is zero or, if
yi > 0, the corresponding condition to maximize profits has to hold. Thus it is straightforward
to treat the supply game as a NCP.
A generalization of the NCP is the mixed complementarity problem (MCP) which allows
the treatment of both inequalities and equalities. The latter have to be paired with uncon-
strained (free) variables. The MCP is also referred to as rectangular [Harker et al. 1990] or
box-constrained [Ferris et al. 1997] variational inequality. In the case of m inequalities and
n−m equalities the MCP has the following form
xi ≥ 0 , Fi(x) ≥ 0 , xiFi(x) = 0 , i = 1, . . . ,m
xi free , Fi(x) = 0 , i = m+ 1, . . . , n .
(26)
Comparing eqs. (22) and (23) with (26) their similar structure becomes apparent. As for
the NCP, the pairing of variables and equations still has to be done for (22). Not being
constrained by any restrictions, the Lagrange parameters λi have to be paired with equations
(23). On the other hand the probabilities qi(si) apparently have to be positive. Following the
same argument as above, the probabilities qi(si) thus have to be paired with eqs. (22).
In the following we recapitulate the formulation of both games in the MCP form, using
the ⊥ notation. Here, we also incorporate a peculiarity of GAMS which only allows to pair a
variable with a lower bound with an ≥ equation and a variable with an upper bound with an
≤ equation [McCarl 2004, Chap. 38]. Since an equation can be written either way by simply
exchanging the left and the right hand side, this is no restriction, but just has to be kept in
mind when implementing the MCP in GAMS.
3.1.2 Instantaneous Supply Game
The profit condition for player i is expressed by
yi ≥ 0 ⊥ 0 ≥ p0
ep
[
1 + ep − 1
d0
(
yext +
∑
j yj + yi
)]
− (cexti + cvari )− λmaxi − λp
p0
epd0
.
(27)
Due to the limited pipeline capacity we have an upper bound on the supplied quantity by
each player.
λmaxi ≥ 0 ⊥ Mi ≥ yi (28)
The endogenously determined natural gas price can be calculated as the model is running,
but it merely acts as a balance equation.
p free , p =
p0
ep
[
1 + ep − 1
d0
(yext +
∑
i yi)
]
(29)
In the case of a maximum price pmax that is lower than the endogenous market price p when
all pipelines run at full capacity, it is assumed that the price equals the maximum price and
the problem reduced to an optimization problem for each player. This situation corresponds
to a market with perfect competition, the players are price takers and (27) is replaced by the
much simpler condition
yi ≥ 0 ⊥ 0 ≥ pmax(t)− (cexti + cvari ) . (30)
If the capacities of all existing pipelines are large enough to supply quantities that do not let
the endogenously calculated price exceed the exogenously given maximum price, the following
equation applies.
λp ≤ 0 ⊥ p0
ep
[
1 + ep − 1
d0
(yext +
∑
i yi)
]
≤ pmax (31)
3.1.3 Game of Timing
Algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in 2-player bimatrix games have been established
long ago [Lemke et al. 1964]. A generalization to n-player matrix games is also available
(e.g. [Ferris et al. 1997] or [McKelvey et al. 1996]). Although it is straightforward to rewrite
the conditions for finding a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies as a complementarity prob-
lem, problems might arise in the computational treatment [McKelvey et al. 1996].
The MCP formulation of the players’ profit condition reads
qi(si) ≥ 0 ⊥ 0 ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
∏n
j=1
j 6=i
qj(sj) ·Πi(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn)− λi . (32)
As a binding constraint the sum over the probabilities qi(si) has to equal unity. Therefore
the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λi is a free or unconstrained variable.
λi free , 0 =
∑
si∈Si qi(si)− 1 (33)
3.2 Implementation in GAMS
Having obtained the system of equations for both games, their implementation in GAMS is
straightforward. In the previous section it was already mentioned that the special syntax of
specifying MCPs in GAMS has to be considered. Details on implementing mixed complemen-
tarity problems in GAMS can be found in [Ferris et al. 2000] or McCarl’s GAMS User Guide
[McCarl 2004]. Once the implementation is achieved, the problems can be solved by invoking
one of the solvers that are suitable for dealing with MCPs, i.e. either MILES [Rutherford 1993]
or PATH [Dirkse et al. 1995, Ferris et al. NA].
As briefly mentioned in section 2.3.2, the payoff matrices’ size grows exponentially with the
number of players. GAMS, not being very efficient in performing simple arithmetic operations,
is therefore not particularly suitable to generate the payoff matrices from the results of the
supply game. Instead a small C++ program is used to generate the payoff matrices.
3.2.1 Supply Game
In the case of the linear inverse demand function where the equilibrium is unique, there
are little problems for the solvers. The choice of an appropriate starting points is of some
importance for the solver algorithms though to achieve convergence within the given iteration
and time limits. Here PATH usually does a better job, even if no initial starting point is
provided by the user. For MILES a well-scaled problem is an important condition for a
successful run and it is much more crucial to supply a starting point in the vicinity of the
solution to find an equilibrium within the iteration and time limits.
3.2.2 Game of Timing
The situation is more complicated for the game of timing. Apart from the symmetry men-
tioned in section 2.3.2 there are no other general symmetries, since the payoff matrices are
generated dynamically. Furthermore we do not know of any proof of concavity. Hence, de-
pending on the model parameters, multiple equilibria might exist. This topic will be discussed
in section 3.3.
It is interesting to note that, contrary to the behavior in the supply game, with very large
timing games2 MILES usually performs better than PATH. In particular this is true if initial
values close to a solution are provided. MILES very quickly finds the solution in such a case,
whereas PATH might run into iteration or time limits. Therefore it is advisable to use both
solvers, especially when one has to deal with large problems.
For large timing games internal GAMS limitations require the system of equations to be
restructured. An upper limit on the nonlinear code block size restricts the sum over s−i in
eq. (32)3. Thus one has to split the sum into smaller parts, introducing auxiliary variables
that finally have to be summed up in another equation. However, this trick has the side effect
of slowing down the solution algorithm considerably. Moreover the splitting of equations only
postpones the problem to some extent, because of the payoff matrices’ exponential growth
with respect to the number of players.
3.3 Multiple Equilibria
In contrast to the supply game where concavity of the payoff functions pii(yi, y−i) ensures that
a unique equilibrium exists [Rosen 1965, Gabay et al. 1980], we do not know of a similar proof
for the game of timing. Hence, in general we have to assume that multiple equilibria in pure
as well as mixed strategies exist. Different concepts try to classify and reduce the number of
equilibria. In the context of games in normal form, some of them are proper, persistent and
stable equilibria. Special algorithms are required to implement these concepts into models.
2Games with 4 or 5 players, each having between 10 and 20 strategies are considered to be large. This
corresponds to payoff matrices with 105 − 106 elements.
3GAMS terminates the execution with the error message Single block NL code size exceeded.
For an overview over the advanced concepts of Nash equilibria see e.g. [Kohlberg et al. 1986].
In this paper we rely on the standard Nash equilibrium and try to identify the equilibria by
(i) employing two different solvers to find solutions of the MCP and (ii) performing multiple
solver runs with randomly generated starting points (see e.g. [Zhigljavsky 1991, chp.2.1]).
Obviously this rather simple approach does not ensure that we will find all existing solutions
of the MCP, but with an increasing number of model runs, the chance to find existing solutions
improves. The Nash equilibria can then be compared by taking into account other criteria,
e.g. Pareto efficiency.
Usually, the larger the number of players and strategies the more equilibria exist. On the
other hand, we find that if the economic and technical parameters of the competing projects
differ sufficiently from each other, the number of Nash equilibria in pure strategies, identified
by the solvers is very limited. Apparently, mixed strategy equilibria play a larger role if the
parameters are very similar for the projects. In particular the symmetric situation exhibits
multiple Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In section 3 of [Rutherford 1995] examples for the
efficiency of locating Nash equilibria in finite n person games are given. [McKelvey et al. 1996]
provides an overview over the computational problems involved in the treatment of this class
of games.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
Most parameters involved in this analysis are estimates of future developments and significant
uncertainties have to be associated with them. Therefore we will perform a detailed sensitivity
analysis, apart from parametric uncertainties also including a variation of important model
assumptions. Among these the inverse demand function (4) as well as the objective function
(15) certainly play an outstanding role and hence will be considered in the following sections.
4.1 Parametric Uncertainties
4.1.1 Supply Game
For the treatment of parametric uncertainties in the supply game we will rely on the method
proposed by Rutherford [Rutherford 1995] which is particularly suitable for the implementa-
tion we have chosen. Suppose a system of nonlinear equations
F (y, x¯) = 0 (34)
has been solved as a MCP. Here y is the vector of variables and x¯ are the mean values of the
uncertain parameters.
Given a solution y?, the influence of variations of the uncertain parameters x around their
mean values x¯ on the solution provides a measure of the solution’s robustness. The total
derivative of F (y, x¯) taken at the solution y? is
dF |y? = ∇yFdy +∇xFdx = 0 , (35)
where ∇yF and ∇xF denote the Jacobians of F with respect to y and x respectively. At the
solution y? the derivative has to vanish by definition (first-order condition). Solving for dy
reveals
dy = −(∇yF )−1∇xFdx = Sdx , (36)
where S is called local sensitivity matrix. According to [Rutherford 1995] S can be calculated
by solving the following set of nonlinear programs for every variable yi.
max
y,x
yi ,
s.t. F (y, x) = 0 , x = x¯
(37)
For yi being the objective, the dual activities associated with the restrictions on x correspond
to the ith row of the sensitivity matrix S. Hence the matrix can be calculated by solving n
separate nonlinear programs.
In the case of a MCP, the nonlinear program, i.e. F (y, x) consists only of those equations
that are binding at the solution y?. Equations with marginal values equal to zero thus have
to be omitted from the system of equations F . As a result uncertainties in restrictions that
are non-binding at the solution have no impact on the solution’s uncertainty. For instance if
a pipeline does not work at full capacity at the solution, the uncertainty associated with the
capacity parameter does not contribute to the uncertainties of the price and supply levels.
This is even true if the supply level is only a tiny fraction from the capacity constraint away.
For that reason this method is local sensitivity analysis.
When determining the impact on the players’ profits, it has to be kept in mind that the
price is a function of various parameters (p0, ep) as well as supply levels. Hence the results for
the uncertainty of price and supply levels, obtained from the local sensitivity analysis, cannot
be varied independently to calculate the uncertainties in the profit functions. This dependency
is also of importance when deriving the uncertainties of the payoff-matrix elements, which
are an input to the game of timing. To explicitly calculate the influence of uncertainties in
all input quantities (results of supply game, investment cost, lifetime, discount rate, . . . ), we
employ a simple Gaussian error propagation for statistically independent parameters.
In the analysis uncertainties in the reference gas price p0, the absolute value of the price
elasticity ep, the upper price limit pmax, the variable extraction and transport costs cexti , c
var
i
and the fixed and annualized investment costs cfixi and c
ann
i are taken into account. Some
of the parameters influence the projects’ profits pii only through their impact on the natural
gas price p and the supplies yi whereas others directly appear as coefficients in eq. (5). The
approximate uncertainty of pii can be expressed as
∆pi2i = +
(
∂pii
∂p0
∆p0
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂ep
∆ep
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂pmax
∆pmax
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂cexti
∆cexti
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂cvari
∆cvari
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂cfixi
∆cfixi
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂cinvi
∆cinvi
)2
+
(
∂pii
∂ri
∆ri
)2
= ∆pi
′2
i +
(
∂pii
∂ri
∆ri
)2
. (38)
The first three terms are obtained from the solution of the NLPs, as described above. The
two terms in the second row have contributions from the NLPs through the price p and
the supplies yi, but also a direct impact on pii. Finally the terms from the third row only
have direct contributions, since the profit condition is independent of them. The annuity of
investments canni is – as can be seen from (6) – a function of investment costs c
inv
i and the
discount rate ri. Since the discount rate is also a parameter in the payoff matrices Πi for
the game of timing (15), its impact on the uncertainty of the profit functions pii cannot be
aggregated into a total uncertainty ∆pi
′
i. Hence, we adapt here investment costs and discount
rate as independent parameters. All parameters apart from the discount rate ri do not appear
in (15) and thus their contribution to the uncertainty ∆pii can be summarized in the term ∆pi
′
i.
The impact of uncertainty in ri is treated separately and thus ri can be varied independently.
4.1.2 Game of Timing
Unfortunately the above described technique is not applicable to the game of timing if the
solutions are Nash equilibria in pure strategies. For pure strategies qi(si) = 0 or 1 for all si, i
and therefore all inequalities become binding. Hence the solution is completely fixed and in
the corresponding NLP the parameters’ marginals are all equal to zero. For mixed strategy
equilibria this is not the case, but since we are mostly interested in pure strategy equilibria,
an implementation of the technique does not seem to be reasonable.
Consequently, we do the following to assess the impact of parametric uncertainties on the
outcome of the timing game. As described in the previous section we estimate the uncer-
tainties of the payoff matrix elements by using the results from the supply game uncertainty
analysis. The corresponding Gaussian error propagation formula for the payoff matrices is
∆Π2i =
(
∂Πi
∂pii
∆pi′i
)2
+
(
∂Πi
∂ri
∆ri
)2
=
t1∑
t=t0
{
(1− ri)2(t−t0)∆pi′2i +
[
(1− ri)(t−t0) · ∂pii
∂ri
−(t− t0)(1− ri)(t−t0−1) · pii
]2
∆r2i
}
, (39)
where for the sake of simplicity the Θ- and δ- functions are not shown. Subsequently the
payoff matrices are varied within these boundaries, taking into account the correlation of
parameters and the influence on the equilibria is observed.
4.2 Alternative Inverse Demand Function
The linear inverse demand function that has been applied so far is a particularly simple and
also easy to handle choice. Certainly it is not unique and from the theoretical point of view not
the most convincing function. Therefore, as an alternative, we introduce an isoelastic inverse
demand function as was used in [Klaassen et al. 2003, Golovina et al. 2002] to observe how
important its choice is for the model results. Using the same independent parameters as in
eq. (4), we obtain
p(y) = p0
(
d0
y
) 1
ep
. (40)
Apparently p(y)→∞ as y → 0 which (i) might cause numerical problems and (ii) is unreal-
istic. To cure the first problem we introduce a small parameter  which is added to y in the
denominator of (40) to avoid divergences. The incentive to increase profits by further and
further reducing supplies can be removed by imposing an upper price limit as discussed in
section 2.2.2. This constraint can then be chosen to equal the price at zero supply for the
linear inverse demand function to make both cases more comparable.
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Figure 1: Inverse demand function: linear and isoelastic.
Figure 1 provides an overview over the different shapes of the inverse demand functions,
based on the same set of parameters p0 and ep.
With the isoelastic inverse demand function, the profit condition (27) is changed to
yi ≥ 0 ⊥ 0 ≥ p0 ·
(
d0
y
) 1
ep
(
1− yi
epy
)
− (cexti + cvari )− λmaxi + λp
p0
ep
· d
1
ep
0
y
1
ep
+1
. (41)
The inverse demand function also has an impact on the endogenously calculated price. Hence
(29) is replaced by
p free , p = p0
(
d0
y
) 1
ep
. (42)
In addition the upper price limit (31) is modified to be
λp ≤ 0 ⊥ p0
(
d0
y
) 1
ep ≤ pmax . (43)
5 Application to China’s Natural Gas Market
To illustrate the operation of the model we will apply it to the Chinese natural gas market,
because of its expected dynamics. An outline of the natural gas market’s development is
followed by an overview of a number of proposed pipelines that will serve us as players for
our model analysis.
5.1 Natural Gas Demand
The future demand for natural gas in China has two driving forces, (i) the need for new sources
of energy driven by strong economic growth and (ii) the desire to reduce coal combustion which
causes serious pollution, especially in urban areas [IEA 2002a, Logan et al. 2002, Rui 2004].
The balance between these main reasons varies among provinces. In the north with its large
coal reserves and correspondingly high utilization of coal, atmospheric pollution is a serious
problem. On the other hand the economically booming southern coastal provinces require
sufficient energy supplies to ensure continuation of economic growth. The IEA assumes an
economic growth of annually 5.7% between 2000 and 2010 and 4.3% for the period from 2010
to 2030 [IEA 2002b].
In the year 2000 coal contributed about 70% to the Chinese primary energy supply (exclud-
ing non-commercial energy), whereas the share of natural gas was around 3%, corresponding
to about 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) [IEA 2002b]. To support the transition to natural
gas Chinese authorities have issued the target to increase domestic production by a factor
of 2 between 2001 and 2005 and to double the share of natural gas in the country’s primary
energy mix within ten years [IEA 2002a]. Along with the exploration of domestic resources,
massive investments in the gas infrastructure are planned to be made. It is worth noting that
most existing pipelines connect a single gas field to a single consumer (which is in many cases
a fertilizer plant). So there is no transportation and distribution infrastructure to supply
gas to a large number of industrial or even residential customers. Since 1996 a number of
long distance pipelines have already been built [IEA 2002a] and the decision to construct the
4000 km long West-East Pipeline (WEP), which will transport about 12 bcm/a of natural
gas from the Tarim Basin to Shanghai, was the centerpiece of the government’s plan to setup
a national gas transmission system [IEA 2002a, IEA 2003].
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Figure 2: Forecasts of natural gas demand gap in China
Although recoverable domestic resources are considerable (1300 bcm [IEA 2002a], 2100
bcm [Logan et al. 2002]), most likely they will not be sufficient to cover the growing demand
for natural gas in the future [IEA 2002a, Brennand 2001]. Corresponding to the differences
in the natural gas demand projections, the expected arising demand gap that needs to be
covered by imports also varies significantly. The IEA projects a demand gap of 47 bcm by
2030, corresponding to 29% of total gas demand [IEA 2002b]. Other sources, mentioned in
[IEA 2002a], assume imports of 44-64 bcm already by the year 2015. In [Logan et al. 2002]
a demand gap of 39.9 bcm by 2015, based on the State Development Planning Commis-
sion’s (SDPC) baseline demand scenario, is given. The corresponding high demand scenario
implies a 22 bcm larger import requirement. Data provided by the Energy Systems Insti-
tute (ESI), Irkutsk, Russia [Kononov et al. 2004] indicate a demand gap of 65 bcm in 2015
and finally reach import requirements of 225 bcm in 2030. A more moderate scenario by
[Kononov et al. 2004] estimates the demand gap to be around 25 bcm/a in 2010 and 70
bcm/a in 2020. For comparison, trends corresponding to the above described scenarios are
presented in Figure 2.
Although the natural gas market was highly regulated in the past, positive trends to-
wards market liberalisation can be observed. For projects developed after 1997 the contract
price is freely negotiable between producer and consumer, thus giving grounds to assume
the establishment of a market price formation in the future. In reality the contract price
still has to be approved by the State Development Planning Commission, but the new price
system can be considered as a first step towards deregulation of natural gas prices in China
[IEA 2002a, Logan et al. 2002, Locatelli 2004].
5.2 Proposed Pipelines
There are a number of major pipeline projects which have been proposed to deliver natural
gas from former CIS countries to the Chinese market. Figure 3 gives an overview over the
region and shows the routes of the pipelines. Three projects are designed to deliver gas from
East Siberia and the Russian Far East to northeast China. The remaining pipelines are taking
routes west of Mongolia and enter China in the northwest region, close to the Tarim basin
where the largest Chinese gas reserves are located. The list of pipelines, where the names
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Figure 3: Proposed routes for natural gas trunk lines in Northeast Asia.
in bold characters are used to refer to the pipelines in the following parts of the paper is
presented below:
• Kovykta - Irkutsk - Zabaikalsk - Harbin
The most promising project so far is a pipeline from Irkutsk’s Kovyktinskoe field to
northeast China and further to South Korea. For this project a feasibility study has
been completed and approved in November 2003 and preliminary letters of intent for
purchasing and selling gas have been signed [CNPC 2003].
• Sakhalin - Khabarovsk - Harbin
This pipeline would deliver gas from the Sakhalin-1 field via Khabarovsk to north-
east China. For Russia the project would include the possibility to develop its gas
infrastructure in the Khabarovsk and Vladivostok regions where the demand could also
grow rapidly [Harrison 2002].
• Republic Sakha - Khabarovsk - Harbin
This pipeline could be realized either as a single project or as an extension of the
Irkutsk pipeline to ensure long-term supply from East Siberia to China and South
Korea. Development costs for this project are estimated to be higher than for the
Kovykta gas field, due to harder natural conditions (e.g. permafrost) and the dispersed
locations of gas fields over a large region [IEA 2002a].
• West Siberia - Gorno-altaisk - Shanshan - Shanghai
In 1997 an agreement between CNPC and Gazprom was concluded to supply gas from
West Siberia through the Altai mountains to the Tarim Basin and further to Shanghai
or Beijing [IEA 2002a].
• Karachaganak gas field (Kazakhstan) - Shanshan - Shanghai
There are activities of China’s CNPC in the development of oil fields in Kazakhstan and
the construction of an oil pipeline is projected. Natural gas supply to China from the
Karachaganak gas field to the Tarim Basin and then to east China has been included
into a scenario by the Asia-Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) [APERC 2000].
• Turkmenistan - Shanshan - Shanghai
The possibility to deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to China and Japan has been
the subject of an agreement between these three countries. A feasibility study for the
pipeline from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China has been
carried out in the 1990’s. Due to its poor economic evaluation and the risks of political
instability, the project is the least probable to be realized [IEA 2002a].
In the IEA World Energy Investment Outlook it is assumed that the first two projects are
going to be built in the decade after 2010, whereas the projects from Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan are expected to start operation not before 2020 [IEA 2003].
6 Calculations and Results
Based on the situation in China and Northeast Asia, described in the previous section, a
scenario for the game theoretic analysis is selected. The required input data for the model
will be presented, followed by model results and a sensitivity analysis.
6.1 Input Data
6.1.1 Pipeline Projects
In section 5 we have given an overview of a number of pipeline projects that have been
proposed to supply natural gas to the Chinese market. As was mentioned, a feasibility
study for the pipeline from Turkmenistan to China came to the conclusion that the project’s
economics was rather poor. Hence we will exclude this project and only consider the remaining
five pipelines in the following analysis. Concerning the other projects it has to be mentioned
that the data only represent the share of the project that is designated to deliver natural gas
to China. For instance the trunk of the Irkutsk pipeline has a designed capacity of 30 bcm,
of which 10 bcm are to be delivered to South Korea. In the present analysis only the Chinese
market is considered though and hence the data represent two thirds of the physical pipeline.
Economic and technical data of all projects are summarized in Table 2.
units Irkutsk Sakhalin Sakha West
Siberia
Kazakhstan
earliest start [-] 2010 2010 2015 2019 2019
length [km] 2800 1800 4200 6100 5100
capacity [bcm/a] 20 12.5 17.5 30 25
inv. cost [mill.$] 6500 3500 8800 15000 12000
fix. cost [mill.$/(bcm/a)] 4.9 4.2 7.5 7.5 7.2
ext. cost [$/1000cm] 47.5 55 60 40 30
var. cost [$/1000cm/
1000km]
22.5 25.5 26.5 22 23
Table 2: Economic and technical parameters of pipeline projects
Most data have been provided by the ESI, Irkutsk, Russia [Kononov et al. 2004] and
have been reconfirmed by comparing them with data from other sources [NAGPF 2004,
Troner 2000, Paik 2005, IEA 1994, IIASA ECS Program 2003]. Construction costs for the
projects found in the literature and various press releases show a considerable spread (e.g.
[Pipeline & Gas Journal 2004]). This is mainly explained by the fact that (i) these data are a
commercial secret and (ii) most projects are still in an early planning stage. For some of the
the projects even the pipeline route is not finally settled, consequently resulting in different
cost estimates. The specific variable transport costs in Table 2 fluctuate around 25$/(1000cm
1000km) which corresponds to values from other sources (e.g. [IIASA ECS Program 2003]).
Extraction or wellhead costs strongly depend on the conditions under which gas is extracted.
The bandwidths in [Troner 2000] are comparable to the data in Table 2. Due to the lack of
data for fixed operation and maintenance costs, we follow a common practice in the literature
and many model applications and set them equal to a fraction of the total investment costs.
As a standard value 1.5% of the investment costs is used, deviations from this value have
been considered in the sensitivity analysis.
For all projects we assume technical and economic lifetimes of ttechi = t
eco
i = 30 years. Also
the discount rates are chosen to be equal at ri = 10%. The latest possible year of entering
the market is t1i = 2020 for the Irkutsk and Sakhalin pipelines and t
1
i = 2030 for the others.
6.1.2 Market Data
For the description of the market behavior, the parameters p0 and ep for a given reference
demand d0 are required to determine the inverse demand function. As mentioned before,
the existing forecasts for the demand gap show considerable variations. Correspondingly the
impact on the parameters of the inverse demand function is rather large. However in our
analysis we choose only one scenario, mainly to demonstrate the model’s applicability. The
scenario is based on the forecasts by the Energy Systems Institute, Irkutsk (Russia) and will
be referred to as the ESI scenario. The estimates for the price p0 and ep shown in Table 3
are provided by the ESI [Kononov et al. 2004] and [Kononov 2001]. The price elasticity is
parameter units 2000 2010 2020 2030
ESI demand d0 [bcm/a] 95 175 255
domestic supply yext [bcm/a] 70 105 140
demand gap d0− yext [bcm/a] 25 70 115
reference price p0 [$/1000cm] 135 150 165 165
price elasticity ep [-] 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.45
price limit pmax [$/1000cm] - - - -
Table 3: Inverse demand function parameters.
an average of the values for power plants and industrial sector. For the time after 2030 all
parameters are fixed to their 2030 values, i.e. we do not extrapolate trends. This approach is
discussed in the context of the model’s time horizon in the following paragraph.
6.1.3 Time Horizon
The choice of the model’s time horizon is of particular importance for the model results.
Apparently the further the time horizon is extended, the larger the uncertainties become. Also
it is difficult to find estimates of demand and prices, that are required to fix the parameters
in the inverse demand function, beyond 2030 in the literature.
Apart from these difficulties there are model inherent problems: Data are only available
for a limited number of projects. Furthermore the projects’ technical lifetime is fixed to 30
years and hence pipelines start to phase out from 2040, assuming first possible market entry in
2010. Obviously the resulting reduction of total supply leads to an increasing price, because
there are no additional pipeline projects that could step in to fill the gap. This again can
create incentives for other projects to postpone their market entry if the increase in profits
compensates the depreciation due to discounting. Therefore it is not advisable to run the
model way beyond the time of first possible phase out, i.e. in our case 2039. Similar effects
occur if demand data are simply extrapolated for the time periods beyond 2030, which might
lead to very high natural gas prices. Thus we choose for the base year t0 and the cut off time
t1 the following values:
t0 = 2000 and t1 = 2039
The use of the annuity of investments in eq. (5) guarantees that the current market value of
the pipeline at t1 is added to the projects’ net present value to compensate for the operation
time cut off. Thus only a share of the investment costs has to be recovered, corresponding to
the ratio of the project’s utilization time to economic lifetime.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 ESI Scenario
For the demand projections of the ESI scenario we find two Nash equilibria in pure strategies4.
As described in section 3.3, we have run the model with a number of randomly generated
initial strategy combinations. The basis of the present analysis are 10000 model runs, where
the order of magnitude of possible pure strategy combinations is 106.
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Figure 4: Physical flows and natural gas price for ESI scenario (equilibrium 1).
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of natural gas supply by individual pipelines on the
left (colored curves) and the corresponding natural gas price on the right axis (black curve).
In Figures 6 and 7 the cumulated discounted cash flow for the different projects in the ESI
scenario is displayed. For this graph the base year of discounting is the year of project
4The number of Nash equilibria in finite games in normal form is odd. Therefore another equilibrium,
possibly in mixed strategies, should exist.
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Figure 5: Physical flows and natural gas price for ESI scenario (equilibrium 2).
commercialization, in contrast to the common base year t0 that is used in the objective
function of the game of timing. Also, the full investment costs have been included to generate
the graph, not just the share corresponding to the time of operation within the model’s time
horizon. Therefore the negative peak of the curves corresponds to the total investment costs,
which have been uniformly distributed over a three-year construction period for illustrative
purposes.
Given the demand projections of ESI, the Irkutsk pipeline in both solutions enters the
market at the earliest possible time, but does not run at full capacity during the first year.
Also the pipeline from Sakhalin is built as soon as possible and, due to its comparatively small
capacity, starts utilizing its full capacity immediately. The Sakha and Kazakhstan pipelines
enter the market in interchanged order in the two solutions. In equilibrium 1 (see Figures 4
and 6) the Sakha pipeline enters the market 12 years after the earliest project start (2027).
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Figure 6: Cumulated cash flow in the ESI scenario (equilibrium 1).
The high extraction costs and the long pipeline length are to be blamed for that. Supplies
from Kazakhstan are more competitive and thus this pipeline is realized before the Sakha
project, but still one year later than possible (2021). In equilibrium 2 (see Figures 5 and 7)
the Sakha project seems to profit from its earlier possible start which results in a delayed
start of the Kazakhstan pipeline. Natural gas supplies from Sakha start in 2020, i.e. five
years after the earliest possible start and the Kazakhstan pipeline starts operation in 2025.
These two pipelines start operating at their full capacity in both equilibria. Gas transport
from West Siberia cannot compete with the other sources under the given assumptions. The
equilibrium solutions suggest not to build this pipeline connection.
The cumulated cash flow by the end of the model’s time horizon, i.e. by 2039, is the largest
for the Irkutsk project. This is however mainly due to being one of the projects that is at the
end of its lifetime by 2039 and having a larger designed capacity than the Sakhalin pipeline
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Figure 7: Cumulated cash flow in the ESI scenario (equilibrium 2).
whereas the other two projects still have a number of operation years to await. Comparing
the projects’ cumulated cash flow at the end of the time horizon for both Nash equilibria,
solution 1 is favorable for the Kazakhstan pipeline. In contrast the Sakha pipeline whose start
is delayed by six years compared with equilibrium 2, shows a slightly reduced cumulated cash
flow by 2039, although the payback time seems to go down in equilibrium 1. For the Irkutsk
and Sakhalin pipelines the two equilibria result in an almost identical cumulated cash flow.
Figures 4 and 5 reveal that the market price between 2020 and 2027 is different in the
two equilibria, due to the interchanged market entry of the Sakha and Kazakhstan projects.
These pieplines have different physical capacities and therefore an impact on the gas price
can be observed.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
6.3.1 Supply Game
To get an idea of the impact, caused by parametric uncertainties on the results of the supply
game, we have varied the concerned parameters independently by 10% and give the resulting
influence on price and supply levels in Table 4.
parameter yi y−i p(y)
p0 ≤ 41% - ≤ 10%
ep ≤ 7.5% - ≤ 4.8%
pmax - - -
cvari ≤ 86% ≤ 29% ≤ 4.4%
cexti ≤ 17% ≤ 6.5% ≤ 1.1%
Table 4: relative uncertainties due to parametric variations in the supply game results
Generally, the impact of parametric variations on the equilibrium solution strongly de-
pends on the particular game situation (see section 4.1.1). The gas price is least influenced by
variations of the parameters. From Table 4 it can be seen that parametric variations on the
10% level can cause variations of up to 10% in the price, but most parametric uncertainties
have a smaller impact. It reacts most sensitive to variations of p0 and ep which directly ap-
pear in the inverse demand function (4). Uncertainties of the projects’ variable transport and
extraction costs have a smaller impact, because they influence the price p(y) only indirectly
via the supplied quantities y. As one can expect, the more players are active on the market
the weaker the influence of the individual player’s parameters on the price.
The situation is different for the supplied quantities yi. If a player is close to the threshold
of profitability, i.e. if the market price is only slightly above the marginal costs (cexti +c
var
i ), the
relative uncertainty can be large. In the corresponding equilibrium the player’s supply is close
to zero. Hence parametric variations can cause uncertainties that are large in comparison with
the actual supply quantities. Fortunately pipelines with such poor economic performance do
not enter the market in the game of timing, because there apart from extraction and variable
costs also the investment and fixed costs have to be recovered. Exactly this happens to the
West Siberia pipeline, which is responsible for the large relative uncertainties of yi in Table 4.
Therefore the values in Table 4 represent upper boundaries for the relative uncertainty and
especially in the case of yi the average uncertainty is less than 20%.
Since we did not make use of the upper bound on the price, a variation of pmax does not
have any impact on the results. Apparently, if the corresponding constraint becomes binding,
a variation of pmax is equivalent to a variation of the price p.
6.3.2 Game of Timing
Following the procedure outlined in section 4.1.2, we have varied the players’ payoff matrices
within the combined uncertainty intervals of all parameters. Hence two additional sets of
payoff matrices are generated
Π±i = Πi ±∆Πi . (44)
With these matrices Π±i the model was evaluated again, the impact on the Nash equilibria is
described in the following paragraph.
Both equilibria show only a moderate response on the variation of the payoff matrices. If
Π−i is substituted for Π the start of the Sakha pipeline is shifted by one year with respect to
the original solution, in equilibrium 1 from 2027 to 2028 and in equilibrium 2 from 2020 to
2021. A similar effect is observed for the Kazakhstan project whose equilibrium strategy stays
unchanged for equilibrium 1, but is shifted from 2025 to 2026 for equilibrium 2. The Irkutsk
and Sakhalin projects still both enter the market in 2011 in both equilibria, i.e. one later
than in the original scenario. A substitution of Π+i shows very similar effects. In equilibrium
1 both the Sakha and Kazakhstan pipelines start to deliver gas one year earlier than in
the original scenario, i.e. in 2026 and 2019 respectively. The strategy of the Sakha project
remains unchanged (2020) in equilibrium 2, whereas the Kazakhstan project is realized one
year earlier (2024).
6.3.3 Alternative Inverse Demand Function
Applying an isoelastic instead of a linear inverse demand function as described in section
4.2 has a moderate impact on the observed equilibria. As can be seen from Figure 1, with
identical parameters, the isoelastic inverse demand function yields a higher gas price than the
linear function. Only at a total supply y equal to the reference demand d0 the values of both
functions are identical.
Again two equilibria can be found which are closely related to the ones described in the
previous section. The result of the different inverse demand functions is a slight shift to
earlier market entry for the Sakha and Kazakhstan pipelines. In equilibrium 1 these two
pipelines enter the market one year earlier, i.e. in 2020 (Kazakhstan) and 2026 (Sakha).
Equilibrium 2 is identical to the second equilibrium in the linear case, i.e. the order of
market entry is changed and Sakha enters in 2020 and Kazakhstan in 2025. Another less
important modification is the slightly better utilization of the Irkutsk pipeline in the first
year of operation, because of the higher gas price.
The price difference between the two model runs with different demand functions is mod-
erate, remaining at less than 10% even in the time period after 2030. Correspondingly the
cumulated cash flow is larger in case of the isoelastic inverse demand function for all pipelines.
For individual projects the difference can be considerable, e.g. for the Irkutsk pipeline it might
sum up to roughly 1.5 bln. $ at the end of the model horizon. However, it is important to
note that this has no effect on the Nash equilibria.
6.4 Discussion
In general the equilibria found by the solvers are very robust and show clear preferences for
the start of pipeline construction and operation. Neither parametric uncertainties on a 10%
level have a large impact on the observed equilibria, nor the variation of the inverse demand
function. A shift of one year in the equilibrium solutions is the maximum deviation from the
original scenario’s outcome.
Almost all pipelines from the start of operation run at their full capacity and thus recover
their investment costs rather quickly. This is due to the assumed inverse demand function.
Choosing for instance the demand gap projection of the IEA in Figure 2 and a low value for
yext leads to a different picture for all pipelines. After the start of operation they only run at
a fraction of the design capacity and only reach their full capacity after 10 to 15 years.
An interesting feature of the observed Nash equilibria is that they all show a natural gas
price between 150 and 250 $/1000cm, which is a result of the chosen parameters of the projects
as well as of the inverse demand function. This price level is relatively high in comparison
with natural gas prices observed so far in the region. Additionally, in China natural gas
has to compete with comparatively cheaper coal which is expected to keep its dominating
position over the next few decades [IEA 2002a]. However, the model price corridor of 150 –
250 $/1000cm corresponds to estimates for the supply side in [NAGPF 2004, chp.4], being
150 – 200 $/1000cm in 2020. The price level that the demand-side would be willing to pay is
considerably lower at 107 – 133 $/1000cm in Bejing [NAGPF 2004, chp.5]. These estimates
are based on a very moderate oil price scenario (22 – 28 $/bbl in 2020). Taking the present oil
price level around 60 $/bbl into account, the model endogenous price level does not appear
to be extremely high. Under such conditions piped gas from Russia and Kazakhstan could
be competitive with other energy carriers.
7 Conclusion
We have described a game-theoretic model in which the players’ strategies are the times
of market entry to analyze the competition between large-scale infrastructure projects. A
two-step procedure for the problem’s formulation is used, leading to a Nash-Cournot game,
the instantaneous supply game, and the timing game in normal form with discrete times as
strategies. Both games are implemented as mixed complementarity problems in GAMS and
solved with the solvers MILES and PATH.
The model has been applied to natural gas pipeline projects from former CIS countries
to China. In practical applications the competition between up to five players has been ana-
lyzed. Special attention was paid to the sensitivity analysis, because most input parameter’s
(e.g. investment costs and market data) are uncertain to a large extend. Apart from the
consideration of parametric uncertainties the analysis was repeated with an alternative in-
verse demand function. The observed Nash equilibria turned out to be very stable under
perturbations of the original data set and the inverse demand function and thus give hints on
the competitiveness of the five pipeline projects.
As has been mentioned in section 5, the natural gas market in China is still in transition
from a highly regulated to an open market, where the price is dependent on supply and
demand only. Therefore the inclusion of a regulating authority as an additional player would
be an interesting feature to study. However, the addition of players with different interests
(e.g. regulating authority, government) is not straightforward, because an objective function
for these players has to be determined. Apparently many possible objective functions for
such institutional players exist. A simple implementation of a regulating authority’s influence
could be the usage of an upper bound on the price. As a matter of fact, the game situation
then is reduced to a simple optimization problem if this price restriction is binding. The
outcome of the supply game is trivial in such a case, because a player with variable costs
below the price limit always operates at full capacity whereas a player with variable costs
above the limit does not supply gas to the market. This situation might be interesting only
if the price constraint is binding in some years, but not in every year, which requires a very
delicately chosen price limit path.
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